Abstract Although, in most commercial ®sheries, ®shing crews are remunerated under a share system, the implications of share systems for ITQ markets have received relatively little attention. In this paper we model the impact of extending crew shares of vessel operating costs to include payments for quota. Allocative eYciency is maintained as long as any share system is adopted consistently across the entire¯eet. Making crews bear a share of quota costs, however, simply in¯ates the quota price: at market equilibrium the vessel owner's pro®t share is unaVected. Crews lose out if the vessel is leasing quota in, but gain if the vessel owner is a net seller of quota. We also consider the outcome if only net purchasers of quota involve crews in the cost of quota. Here, all vessel owners bene®t, while all crews see a reduction in their earnings. These results are illustrated with a simple numerical example.
Introduction
In many, if not most, commercial ®sheries, ®shing crews are rewarded under a share or "lay" system (Sutinen, 1979; Anderson, 1982; Matthiasson, 1999; McConnell and Price, 2006) . Despite this, most economic models of the ®shery either treat labour costs in a similar way to other variable costs, i.e., as related to harvest or ®shing eVort, or assume (implicitly) that labour is paid a ®xed wage. If instead there is a share system of crew remuneration, and owners of ®shing ®rms make decisions based only upon their shares of the costs and bene®ts to the ®rm, this can have signi®cant implications for economic outcomes in the ®shery.
A case in point is the use of ITQs (individual transferable quotas) in ®sheries management. ITQ systems are now widely employed in commercial ®sheries in order to achieve eYcient regulation of harvest. Although, in almost all such ®sheries, crews are remunerated using a share system, it is common for quota costs to be borne entirely by the vessel owner, as is the case in Iceland and Australia, for example. In some instances, however, the fact that payments for quota leasing appear as additional ®nancial costs to the ®rm has led to a practice of sharing quota costs between owner and crew, along with other variable operating costs. This is now the norm in the UK, for example, where revenues and operating costs (including the costs of quota leasing) are generally split 50:50 between owner and crew.
1 It is not immediately clear, however, what consequences this has for the economic performance of the¯eet and for the earnings of vessel owners and their crews. Empirical studies of crew remuneration under ITQ systems have reported both negative (Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009 ) and positive (Abbott, Garber-onts and Wilen, 2010) income eVects due to the introduction of ITQs, but there appears to be no record of the impact of changes in crews' shares of quota costs under an existing ITQ regime.
The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of sharing the cost of quota for the generation and distribution of economic pro®ts in an ITQ ®shery. Although there is now a large theoretical literature on ITQs, relatively few authors have considered the implications of share payments for the properties of ITQ markets. Anderson (1999) examines the long run eYciency of the¯eet under an ITQ system when the crew are paid on a share basis, concluding that full eYciency in the long run can only be achieved if the vessel owner and the crew have equal shares of both quota costs and what we will refer to as "operating pro®ts" (revenues minus non-labour variable costs). If owners pay all the quota costs, long run eYciency cannot be achieved, it is held, since individual owners under-invest, vessels harvest too little and the¯eet will be too large as a consequence. Hannesson (2000) ®nds that the vessel owner's decision to invest in ITQs under a share system is distorted if a share of pro®ts is paid to the crew, and argues that over-investment in physical capital may occur as a result. McConnell and Price (2006) consider the allocative eYciency of ITQs with a share system and show that the quota market will be ineYcient if the owner's shares of revenues and non-labour harvesting costs diverge. These authors do not, however, examine the implications of crew shares for the generation and distribution of rents under an ITQ system. Only Anderson (1999) explicitly considers the relationship between the share rate and the price at which quota is traded between vessels, but he does so in the context of a long run industrial equilibrium, with adjustments in both¯eet and stock size, and with identical shares pertaining for both quota costs and operating pro®ts throughout.
The focus in this paper is on the relative share rates for quota costs and operating pro®ts, rather than the share rate per se, and the impact these have on economic pro®ts and the quota price, as well as the earnings by owner and crew. We ®nd that the equilibrium quota price is sensitive to the diVerence between the owner's share of operating pro®ts and his share of quota costs. While this may not be unexpected, what is perhaps less intuitive is that changes in the owner's share of the cost of quota have no eVect upon his total pro®t share when shares are the same across the entire¯eet. All the impacts of resultant changes in the quota price are felt by the crew, who experience a loss or gain in income as a result. We also examine a situation in which net sellers of quota are reluctant to share quota income with the crew, while net purchasers of quota share their quota costs. Here we ®nd that both categories of vessel owner are better oV under a sharing arrangement, whereas both crews see a loss in income.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of a ®shing ®rm in an ITQ market with crew shares. The implications of crew shares of quota costs are then explored in the following two sections, ®rstly assuming that shares are the same for all vessels in the¯eet and then assuming that only ®rm owners who are net purchasers of quota share quota costs. Section 5 provides a simple numerical illustration of the results, while a ®nal section concludes.
A ®shing ®rm model with ITQs and crew shares
Consider an ITQ ®shery made up of a large number of price taking ®shing ®rms. For simplicity, we will assume that each ®rm operates a single ®shing vessel. For a representative ®rm, total short run pro®ts as a function of harvest q i and quota demand Q i are given by
where r is the equilibrium quota rental (lease) price andQ i ³ 0 is the ®rm's initial quota endowment (or, equivalently, the quantity of quota held by the ®rm as an asset). The private bene®t (or "operating pro®ts") function
where p is the market price for output and c i (q i ) are (non-labour) variable harvesting costs. As is usual, we assume convex costs, so that c i (q i ) > 0 and hence
Let the ®rm owner's shares of operating pro®ts and quota lease costs be given by 0 < a i < 1 and 0 < g i £ 1 respectively. The crew's shares of operating pro®ts and quota costs are therefore 0
We assume throughout that the crew's reservation wage remains constant and is always met, i.e., labour's participation constraint is never binding. The total quantity of labour is, as a consequence, unchanged. For simplicity, therefore, the opportunity cost of crew labour is not explicitly included in the model. Assuming quota compliance, the owner's short run pro®t maximisation problem is then
From the ®rst order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a solution to (3), it is straightforward to ®nd the owner's optimal decision rule for q
where
. Unless g i = a i , this expression diVers from the usual result for a competitive quota or permit market, which is the equality of marginal (social) bene®ts with the equilibrium lease price of permits/quota. Clearly, for marginal bene®ts (and hence marginal costs) to be equated across all ®rms in the ®shery, we require either g i = a i for each ®rm, or, if g i = a i , for the shares a and g to be the same for all ®rms. Otherwise, the quota allocation will not be eYcient (except by chance).
In order to examine the quota market implications of diVerent share arrangements, we go on to consider two scenarios: ®rstly, one in which any change in the owner's quota share relative to his share of operating pro®ts occurs across all ®rms symmetrically; secondly, one in which a change in the owner's quota share aVects only some ®rms in the¯eet. In each case, we assume that the size of the¯eet remains unchanged.
Crew shares are the same for all ®rms
To begin with, we assume that at quota market equilibrium the shares a and g are the same across all ®rms in the¯eet. We can therefore treat a single ®rm as a model for the entire¯eet, in the sense that the same equilibrium conditions containing a and g hold for all ®rms (there is no requirement for symmetry in the cost functions, for example).
3 Note that heterogeneity in quota endowments is suYcient to generate trade in quota.
Suppose we have g > a and hence, from equation (4), B (q * ) > r. This implies that the equilibrium quota price is less than the marginal bene®t of harvest to the ®rm. Not surprisingly, if the owner bears a disproportionately large share of the cost of quota, quota is traded at below its marginal value to the ®rm as a whole. If g < a, on the other hand, then B (q * ) < r and quota is eVectively overvalued with respect to its marginal bene®t to the ®rm.
Totally diVerentiating (4) and rearranging, we obtain an expression for the slope of the owner's quota demand as
where B -( ) is the slope of the inverse of B (q). 4 All else equal, therefore, the greater is the owner's share g in the cost of quota, the steeper is his quota demand function and hence the lower is his demand for quota at any given quota price. As a result, the industry inverse quota demand will have a shallower slope as g increases and a steeper slope as g is reduced. For a given total quota supply (total allowable catch or TAC), therefore, the industry equilibrium quota price is reduced (increased) if g is increased (reduced) relative to a. Changes in both g and a which leave the ratio g/a unaltered, on the other hand, will have no eVect upon individual quota demands and hence no eVect upon the equilibrium quota price.
Notice that, given the concavity in the bene®t function, g = a in (4) seems to imply that total ®rm pro®ts are not maximised by the ®rm owner: from (1) we would expect total pro®ts for both owner and crew to be maximised where B (q * ) = r. If, instead, the ®rm operates where B (q * ) > r for example, it appears to underproduce for the observed quota price. But in this case, as we have seen, the equilibrium quota price will be lower than it would be if all ®rms set B (q * ) = r. All else equal, if the quota market clears and the quota allocation continues to be eYcient (as we have shown for symmetry in shares) then output for the representative ®rm is unchanged by a change in g and hence a change in the quota price r. Therefore, total economic pro®ts are unaVected by an increase or a decrease in g, holding a constant: there is simply a concomitant reduction or increase in the value of quota.
In order to examine this further, letr be the equilibrium quota price wheñ g = 1 > a (the owner bears all quota costs). Then from (4) we have
If we now reduce g from g = 1 to g = a, holding a constant, we will then have a quota price r such that
If there is no change in the output of the representative ®rm, as we have argued, then 4 We assume that, for all ³ , the function has an inverse -. By the inverse function rule, we then have
and therefore
which implies r >r. The quota price is therefore increased by the reduction in g. Suppose, in this example, that the ®rm is a net purchaser of quota, i.e., Q * >Q. Wheng = 1, the cost to the owner of a unit of quota isgr =r. If g is then reduced to g = a, the owner's unit quota costs are now gr. But, if a is unchanged, we can observe that
Hence, if q * = Q * has not changed, the owner's quota costs have not changed. Since there has also been no change in the owner's share of operating pro®ts a, we can see that making the crew pay a share of the quota costs merely in¯ates the quota price at their expense: at quota market equilibrium there is no net gain to the ®rm owner.
We get the opposite result if g is increased from g = a < 1 to g = 1, again holding a constant. Now, if the ®rm is a net purchaser of quota, we will see a reduction in the equilibrium quota price and an increase in crew remuneration. This represents a transfer from the total cost of quota to the total earnings of the crew.
It is straightforward to show that if the ®rm is a net seller of quota (and we assume that the income from leasing out quota is shared pro rata with the crew -see Section 4) then the impacts on crew remuneration from a change in g are simply reversed. Thus, all else equal, an increase in g results in a reduction in both total quota income and total crew remuneration, while a reduction in g produces an increase in total quota income and crew remuneration. At market equilibrium, therefore, sharing the income from quota leasing with the crew has no net negative impact upon the owner's pro®ts.
In each case, with g and a the same across all ®rms in the¯eet, the allocation of quota continues to be eYcient. While the total value of quota changes with changes in g relative to a, therefore, total economic pro®ts in the ®shery remain unaltered.
4 Crew quota shares diVer across ®rms
Although sharing the cost of quota with the crew has no impact upon the owner's total share of the pro®ts (operating pro®ts less quota costs, or plus quota income) when all ®rms behave symmetrically, clearly there is an incentive for individual owners whose quota endowments are such that they are net sellers of quota to retain a 100% share of quota income. We therefore examine the quota market outcome if only net buyers of quota reduce the owner's quota share g.
Consider a ®shing¯eet consisting of just two representative (price-taking) ®rms. Although we will assume for the moment that the ®rms are otherwise identical, we let the quota endowmentsQ i be such that Firm 1 leases quota to Firm 2.
6 Let the initial quota shares (the same for both ®rms) be g i = 1 > a i , i = 1, 2. To begin with, therefore, both ®rms' quota demands satisfy
Now consider what happens if Firm 2, a net purchaser of quota, reduces g to g = a < 1. The equilibrium quota price must then increase, since Firm 2's quota demand curve becomes¯atter as a result and therefore the industry inverse quota demand curve must become steeper. Because Firm 1's decision rule (11) remains the same, its output and therefore quota demand is reduced in response to the increased quota price and hence it now leases more quota to Firm 2, which expands its output. Firm 2's quota demand now satis®es
which implies B (q * ) < B (q * ), which, if the ®rms are identical, con®rms that now q * > q * . The result is nevertheless robust to heterogeneity in the¯eet, as the numerical example in Section 5 illustrates.
In the new quota market equilibrium, Firm 1's owner bene®ts from increased quota leasing at an increased quota price, although his share of operating pro®ts is reduced as the ®rm's output is reduced. Employing the Envelope Theorem, and using Q * = q * , from the Lagrangian for (3) we can ®nd
which is unambiguously positive for a net seller of quota. Firm 1's crew, on the other hand, clearly lose out since they only get a share of operating pro®ts, which are reduced. Firm 2 increases its output and hence total operating pro®ts, and both the owner's and the crew's shares of operating pro®ts are therefore increased. While total quota costs are unambiguously increased, these are now split between the owner and the crew. From
and
we can see that, given Q * >Q , the owner of Firm 2 will bene®t from a reduction in g but lose from an increase in the quota price r. Since we have seen that a reduction in g relative to a increases the owner's marginal willingness to pay for quota, however, it follows that the owner derives a net bene®t from the change and hence we must have
The total crew remuneration (pro®t share) for Firm 2 is given by
so that we can ®nd
which again uses Q * = q * . Given that the owner ensures that a B (q * ) = g r, and that now we have a = g , this reduces to
Similarly, we can ®nd
Thus we con®rm that a reduction in g and an increase in the quota price will lead to a reduction in crew remuneration for Firm 2. Finally, notice that while the total value of quota increases, the total economic pro®t in the ®shery must decrease, since the allocation of quota is now ineYcient.
A numerical example
We illustrate the results using a simple numerical example with two ®rms in the ®shery: one ®rm to represent all net sellers of quota and the other to represent all net quota purchasers. To give a speci®c functional form to equation (3), let
The ®rst order conditions for the owners' optimal choices of q
Solving for r, and substituting using º Q * + Q * =Q +Q , we can employ a little manipulation to ®nd
together with a similar expression for Q * , as well as
Equations (22) and (23) together describe fully the quota market equilibrium. Given the parameters p andQ i as well as the cost coeYcients c i , we can then calculate the equilibrium quota market outcomes for any combination of the shares a i and g i .
Let p = $10, 000,Q = 100 tonnes andQ = 20 tonnes, so that = 120 tonnes, with c = 0.1 and c = 0.05. Notice that we have now relaxed the assumption that the ®rms are identical: here Firm 2 is clearly more eYcient than Firm 1, although its initial quota endowment is smaller. Table I shows the quota market outcome when a = a = 0.5 and g = g = 1. Firm 1 leases 60 tonnes of quota to Firm 2 at an equilibrium price of $3, 000. Total economic pro®ts in the ®shery are $960,000, of which $360,000 is captured in the value of quota. In Table II , we show the results when both g i shares are reduced to equal the a i shares. Notice that the (eYcient) quota allocation is unchanged, as are the total economic pro®ts in the ®shery. Now, however, the value of quota is doubled and the impact of this is entirely felt by the crew. The crew of Firm 1 more than double their income (from $160,000 to $340,000) while the crew of Firm 2 see their total remuneration reduced from $320,000 to $140,000. Table III shows the outcome when only Firm 2 reduces g to equal a , while Firm 1 retains g = 1. Compared to the outcome in Table I , we can see that although the total value of quota is increased, total pro®ts in the ®shery are reduced since the quota allocation is now ineYcient. The owner of Firm 1 gains as a result of the increased leasing of quota to Firm 2, but Firm 1's crew lose out. As predicted, there is also a net gain for the owner of Firm 2, while the crew of Firm 2 suVer a net loss in income.
Conclusion
We have shown that, all else equal, changes in the share of quota costs paid by the ®rm owner, when undertaken symmetrically across the whole¯eet, have an impact upon the equilibrium quota price but do not change the owner's total pro®t share. The eVects of changes in the quota price fall entirely upon the crew, who gain or lose a share of pro®ts as a result. We have also seen that the eYciency of quota allocation is maintained as long as the owners' shares of quota costs and operating pro®ts are consistent across the¯eet: there is no requirement for these shares to be equal.
Given this, if the ®xed (capital) costs of the ®rm are paid from the owner's share of the total pro®ts, as is usually the case, there appear to be no implications for long run eYciency if there are changes across the¯eet in the owners' share of quota costs. A positive crew reservation wage on the other hand, which represents a quasi-®xed cost to be covered by the crew's share of operating profits, would impose an upper limit on the percentage of quota costs which can be borne by the crew. We have assumed, however, that labour's reservation wage is exogenous to the ®shery in question. We have also assumed, in our analysis of the eVects of changes in quota shares, that this remuneration constraint is never binding. We have further assumed that changes in crew shares do not aVect their incentives for eVort and hence (in our model) harvesting costs. Throughout, labour retains a share in marginal pro®ts and we would not therefore expect any fundamental change in the incentive structure of the labour contract.
If only some ®rm owners share quota costs with the crew (and we assumed that net sellers of quota might be reluctant to do so) we saw that quota allocation would no longer be eYcient and that total economic pro®ts in the ®shery would be reduced as a result. Nevertheless, the equilibrium quota price would still increase, and all ®rm owners would bene®t at the expense of their crews.
Although there seems to be a widespread, if not universal, reluctance on behalf of the governments of ®shing nations to attempt to extract resource rents from the industry, a share system which eVectively increases the proportion of economic pro®ts which are re¯ected in the value of quota has interesting implications for rent capture policies (see, for example, Grafton, 1992; 1995) . At the very least, the generation of rents in the ®shery is more accurately measured than in a share ®shery where crew do not share in the cost of quota, since a part of the surplus previously paid to the crew is now transferred to the value of quota. In consequence, a tax on quota value, for example, would have the potential to capture a greater proportion of the rents generated in the ®shery.
Finally, just as we have not addressed the evolution and persistence of ®sh-eries share systems in general, a subject which has been well covered elsewhere (see, for example, McConnell and Price, 2006), so we have left to one side the process by which changes in quota shares might be negotiated. The bargaining aspects of this could be a fruitful area for future investigation. 
